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Abstract
This paper has demonstrated how personal taxes, default risk,
leverage-related costs, and limited liability of securityholders affect
the systematic risks of equity and debt respectively. When personal
taxes are nonexistent and default risk is remote and leverage-related
costs are negligible and the limited liability of securityholders is
not recognized, the results derived in this paper have been shown to
collapse into Hamada and Rubinstein's traditional formulation. Since
more than one of the aforementioned market imperfections exist in the
real world, the results derived here are thus more general in specifi-
cation.
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II. Market Values of Different Claims
Let X denote the firm's end-of-period cash flows which are assumed
to be jointly normally distributed with the return on the market port-
~ — 2 — 2
folio so that X _ N(X, a„) for any given assessment of R and a . The
X ' mm
after-tax cash flows to the owners of the unlevered firm are
,
X(l-x) if X >
Y - U-x pq ) ~ (2)u PS if X <
where T is the constant marginal personal tax rate on equity income;
and x is the proportional corporate income tax rate. Therefore, the
market value of the unlevered firm, according to the CAPM, is given by
V
u
= (l- T
pS
)(l-T)[E (X) - XCovQ (X, Rm)](R)"
1
,
(3)
where
00
E (X) = / Xf(X)dX;
X = the market price of risk;
Cov
n
(X, R ) = E{[Xn - E„(X)][R - E(R )]}u m U u m m
= the partial covariance between X (truncated
~ 2
above 0) and R ; and
m
R = 1 + Rf , wherein Rf is the risk-free interest rate.
For simplicity, assume that the firm issues only common equity
3
and a single-period balloon-payment bond, both of which have limited
4
liability. The total promised payment to bondholders, D, is tax
deductible. Because of the use of leverage, the firm is subject to the
type of agency problems pointed out by Jensen and Meckling [11] who
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argue that the presence of risky debt may induce the firm to undertake
suboptimal investments. Since the incentive for suboptimal investments
increases with the amount of risky debt outstanding, the ex-ante agency
costs of debt is assumed (for simplicity) to be a percent of the total
promised payment to bondholders. That is, aD reflects the change in
cash flows due to both the change in investment policy and the moni-
toring and bonding costs. Bankruptcy is defined as the state in which
the firm's end-of-period cash flows are less than the ex-ante agency
costs and the total promised payment to bondholders, X < (l+a)D. At
the end of the period, shareholders receive the after-tax residual
value of the firm if it remains solvent, or they receive nothing if
the firm goes bankrupt. On the other hand, bondholders receive their
contractual claims of D at the end of the period if the firm is sol-
vent. Otherwise, the end-of-period cash flows will be transferred to
the bondholders who have to incur the costly bankruptcy penalties, K.
Under such a setting, the respective end-of-period cash flows to share-
holders and bondholders are
(1-t)(X-oD-D) if X > (l+ct)D = B
Y_ = (1-T p-) | ~ (4)S PS if X_<_ B,
D if X 2. B
Y
D
= (l-T
pD ) {
X-aD-K if H = aD+K < X < B (5)
if X £ H,
where t is the constant marginal personal tax rate on debt income.
The respective market values of equity and debt can be expressed as
follows
:
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V = (1-T )(1-T){E (X) - XCov (X, R ) - (l+o)D[l-F(B)]}(R) L (6)PS" ' l B v ' B v ' m
B,~
V
D
=
C 1
-'
PD )1
D U-F(B)] + Ej(X) - ACovJJU, R
ffl
)
- (aD+K)[F(B)-F(H)]}(R) X (7)
B H
where F(B) = / f(X)dX = default probability; and F(H) = / f(X)dX.
—oo —oo
By adding (6) and (7) and then substituting V in (3) and V^ in (7),
u D
the market value of the firm can be expressed as
(1-T) (1-T )
V
T
= V + V = V + [1 — —]V.. - V,, (8)
L S D u 1-T D K
where V
R
= (l-x
ps
)(l-x) [Eq(X) - ACoVq(X, lO + aD[l-F(H) ]+K[F(B)-F(H)] } (R)" 1
= the present value of "ex ante" leverage-related costs.
Equation (8) shows that the market value of the levered firm is the sum
of the market value of the unlevered firm plus the tax subsidy on debt
and minus the present value of "ex ante" leverage-related costs.
III. Systematic Risk and Leverage
From the CAPM, the systematic risk of equity is defined as
Cov(Y R )
g
S
m
Sn^
(9)
S m
2
where a is the variance of market portfolio's returns. Using
m r o
Cov(Y R ) = (1-T )(1-t)Cov(X,RJ[1-F(B)], 8 (9) can be rewritten as
_ (l-T p _)(l-T)Cov(X, R )
B =
— 5 U-F(B)]. (10)
b m
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Likewise, substituting Cov(Y
u
,R
m
) = (l-T
ps
)(l-T)Cov(X,R
m
) [l-F(O)
]
into the definition of the unlevered firm's systematic risk of the
unlevered firm yields
,
Cov(Y
,
R ) (1-tdg )(1-t)Cov(X, R
J
6
u
m L^_JL_ = ES m_. U_F(0)] f (n)
V a V a
urn u m
where [l-F(O)] reflects the limited liability of the unlevered share-
holders.
By combining (10) and (11), the relationship between and 6 can
be obtained as shown below;
D
This result shows that the systematic risk of equity is equal to the
systematic risk of the unlevered firm adjusted for the difference in
equity value of the two firms and the survival probability (the
bracketed expression in (12)). Substituting V from rearranging (8)
into (12) yields
- m (1-T)(1-TDC ) Vn V„ . .
8
S.
B
u{l+[___ES_] ^ +
_£}l^ i) . (13)
Equation (13) indicates that the systematic risk of equity is a
function of the systematic risk of the unlevered firm 6 , the corporate
income tax rate x, the personal tax rates t and t , the leverage
ratio (VpVV ) , the present value of "ex ante" leverage-related costs
V (mainly agency costs of debt), the level of total promised payment
2
D, the variance rate on the cash flows of the firm o
,
protection of
limited liability (1 - F(0)), and the probability of default F(3).
Therefore, the presence of default risk in the model implies that even
-6-
if the systematic risk of the unlevered firm is stationary, the system-
atic risk of equity will be nonstationary. Furthermore, the systematic
risk of equity is a nonlinear function of leverage due to the presence
of default risk and limited liability. When personal taxes are non-
existent and default risk is remote and the present value of "ex ante"
leverage-related costs is negligible and the limited liability of
securityholders is not recognized, equation (13) simply reduces to
Hamada and Rubinstein's traditional formulation. Thus, the systematic
risk of equity as defined in (13) is more general in its specification
than the traditional formulation. To illustrate this, two special
cases of (13) are discussed below.
Case I: assuming x = x = 0, riskless debt, and no limited
liability, then
6
b
= B
u [l+(l-x) Tp], (13-1)
s
where S
U
= (l-x)Cov(X.R )/(V a ),
m urn
V = (l-x)[E(X)-\Cov(X,R )J(R)
_1
,
u m
V
D
- D(R)" 1 , and
Vc = (l-x)[E(X)-XCov(X,RiTi )-D](R)"
1
.
5 m
When debt is riskless, equation (13) simply collapses into Hamada and
Rubinstein's traditional formulation as shown in (13-1).
Case II: assuming x = x = 0, risky debt but zero leverage-related
costs (a = K = 0), and limited liability, then
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V
8 = g [H-(l-T) —][ i-f(0) 3 > (13
"2)
(l-x)Cov(X,R )
where g
U
= 5 ~ * U"F(0)],
V a
u m
V = (l-x)[E
n (X) - XCovn (X,R )](R)
_1
,
u m
V
D
= {D[l-F(D)j + Eq(X) - ACovQ(X,R
m
)}(R)" 1
,
V = (l-T){E
n (X) - ACovn(X,R) - D[1-F(D)]}(R)b k u urn '
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This version of beta, (13-2), is derived under the assumptions of risky
debt and limited liability of corporate securityholders. Even this
model is more general than Hamada and Rubinstein's traditional formula-
tion as shown in (13-1) because of the presence of survival probability
and protection of limited liability.
In similar fashion, the systematic risk of debt can be defined as
(1-x )Cov(X,R )
B
D
m
FD m_
. [F(B) _F(H)] . (14)
D m •
By solving (11) and (14) for Cov(X,R )/a and substituting V from re-
m m u
arranging (8), produces
fl
D
-
fi
Um-Tl ,
V
S
,
Yr 1" TPD ,
f
F(B)-F(H)
1
where F(B)-F(H) measures the probability that bondholders are in default
after their limited liability is taken into account.
We can further demonstrate the linkage between the systematic risk
of equity, the systematic risk of the unlevered firm, and the systematic
9
risk of debt as follows.
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_
(1-t )(1-t) V
n V„
PD S S
_
pD,V
f
(1 T
PS )U T) H F(B)-F(0) 1Y 1_T PD H F(B)-F(H) J -
(16)
In the presence of zero personal taxes, risky debt, but zero leverage-
related costs, equation (16) simply reduces to
V V
3
S
= B
u [l+(l-x)rp-J - D [(1-t)-^]. (17)
S S
This result is consistent with Conine (1980) in the presence of risky
debt. Therefore, the model derived in (16) is more general. When debt
becomes riskless, 8 - 0, equation (17) is identical to Hamada and
Rubinstein's traditional formulation as shown in (13-1).
V. Conclusion
The paper has demonstrated how personal taxes, default risk,
leverage-related costs, and limited liability of securityholders affect
the systematic risks of equity and debt respectively. When personal
taxes are nonexistent and default risk is remote and leverage-related
costs are negligible and the limited liability of securityholders is
not recognized, the results derived in this paper have been shown to
collapse into Hamada and Rubinstein's traditional formulation. Since
more than one of the aforementioned market imperfections exist in the
real world, the results derived here are thus more general in specifi-
cation.
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Footnotes
Recently Yagill [27] attempts this but his valuation model with
bankruptcy costs is arbitrary without an explicit specification of the
bankruptcy cost function.
2
For discussion of truncation, refer to Lintner [15] and Chen
[3, 4]. For closed form expressions of the partial mean and partial
covariances, see Gonzales, Litzenberger , and Rolfo [8] and Rhee [23].
3
A single-period discount bond as assumed by Merton [17] and Galai
and Masulis [7] could also be used.
4
Gonzales, Litzenberger, and Rolfo [8] discuss the issue of the
absurdity of the mean-variance model for optimal capital structure
decisions. Specifically, they point out that the market value of a
levered firm is not a monotonically increasing function of its finan-
cial leverage. Recently, Rhee [23] has correctly proved that the
"reductio ad absurdum" argument does not necessarily hold when the
restriction on corporate borrowing is explicitly considered in light
of shareholder limited liability.
This includes accounting and legal expenses incurred, loss of
sales and increased costs due to disruption of operatings during
periods of financial distress including bankruptcy. For an excellent
discussion of bankruptcy costs, see Kim [12].
In a recent excellent synthesis by Kim [13] , the ex-ante agency
costs of debt are assumed to be random and an increasing function of
the total promised payment to bondholders. Without loss of generality,
it is assumed in this paper that the ex-ante agency costs of debt are
proportionate to the total promised payment to bondholders.
Miller [18], in his horse-and-rabbit stew criticism, argues that
bankruptcy costs should be economically insignificant. However,
several post-Miller papers (see [1], [6], [13], and [26]) suggest that
leverage-related costs (bankruptcy costs and agency costs) are still
important factors to derive the unique interior optimal leverage even
in the presence of personal taxes.
g
See Lintner [15], p. 19.
9
The proof is available from the author upon request.
-10-
Ref erences
1. Barnea, A., Haugen, R. A., and Senbet, L. W. , "An Equilibrium
Analysis of Debt Financing Under Costly Tax Arbitrage and
Agency Problems," Journal of Finance
,
(June 1981), pp. 569-581.
2. Bowman, R. , "The Theoretical Relationship Between Systematic Risk
and Financial (Accounting) Variables." Journal of Finance
,
(June 1979), pp. 617-630.
3. Chen, A. H. , "Recent Development in the Cost of Debt Capital."
Journal of Finance
,
(June 1978), pp. 863-877.
4.
,
"A Theory of Corporate Bankruptcy and Optimal Capital
Structure." In J. Bicksler, ed., Handbook of Financial
Economics . Holland: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1978.
5. Conine, T. E. , Jr., "Corporate Debt and Corporate Taxes: An
Extension." Journal of Finance
,
(September 1980),
pp. 1033-1037.
6. DeAngelo, H. and Masulis, R. W. , "Optimal Capital Structure Under
Corporate and Personal Taxation," Journal of Financial
Economics
,
(March 1980), pp. 3-29.
7. Galai, D. and Masulis, R. , "The Option Pricing Model and the Risk
Factor of Stock." Journal of Financial Economics
,
(January/
March 1976), pp. 53-81.
8. Gonzales, N. , Litzenberger , R. , and Rolfo, J., "On Mean Variance
Models of Capital Structure and the Absurdity of Their Predic-
tions." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
,
(June
1977), pp. 165-179.
9. Hamada, R. , "The Effect of the Firm's Capital Structure on the
Systematic Risk of Common Stocks." Journal of Finance
,
(May
1972), pp. 435-452.
10. Hill, N. and Stone, B. , "Accounting Betas, Systematic Operating
Risk, and Financial Leverage: A Risk-Composition Approach to
the Determinants of Systematic Risk." Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis
,
(September 1980), pp. 595-637.
11. Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. , "Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." Journal of
Financial Economics
,
(October 1976), pp. 305-360.
12. Kim, E., "A Mean-Variance Theory of Optimal Corporate Structure
and Corporate Debt Capacity." Journal of Finance , (March
1978), pp. 45-63.
-il-
ls. , "Miller's Equilibrium, Shareholder Leverage Clienteles,
and Optimal Capital Structure," Journal of Finance , (May
1982), pp. 301-319.
14. Lintner, J., "The Valuation or Risky Assets and the Selection of
Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets."
Review of Economics and Statistics
,
(February 1965), pp. 13-37.
15. , "Bankruptcy Risk, Market Segmentation, and Optimal
Capital Structure." In Risk & Return in Finance
,
I. Friend
and J. Bicksler, eds. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1977.
16. Mandelker, G. and Rhee, S. G. , "The Impact of the Degrees of
Operating and Financial Leverage on Systematic Risk of Common
Stocks." Forthcoming in Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis
,
(March 1984), pp. 45-57.
17. Merton, R. , "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure
of Interest Rates." Journal of Finance
,
(May 1974), pp.
449-470.
18. Miller, M. , "Debt and Taxes," Journal of Finance
,
(May 1977), pp.
261-275.
19. Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. , "The Cost of Capital, Corporate
Finance, and the Theory of Investment." American Economic
Review
,
(June 1958), pp. 261-297.
20. , "Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A
Correction." American Economic Review
,
(June 1963), pp.
433-443.
21. Mossin, J., "Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market." Econometrica
,
(October 1966), pp. 768-782.
22. Myers, S., "The Relationship Between Real and Financial Measures
of Risk and Return." In Studies in Risk and Return , J.
Bicksler and I. Friend, eds. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing
Co., 1977.
23. Rhee, S. G. , "Shareholder Limited Liability and Mean-Variance
Models of Capital Structure." Decision Sciences
,
(January
1984).
24. Rubinstein, M. , "A Mean-Variance Synthesis of Corporate Finance
Theory." Journal of Finance
,
(March 1973), pp. 167-181.
25. Sharpe, W. , "Capital Asset Price: A Theory of Market Equilibrium
Under Conditions of Risk." Journal of Finance
,
(September
1964), pp. 425-442.
-12-
26. Taggart, R. A., "Taxes and Corporate Capital Structure in an
Incomplete Market," Journal of Finance
,
(June 1980), pp.
645-b59.
27. Yagill, J., "On Valuation, Beta, and the Cost of Equity Capital
A Note." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
,
(September 1982), pp. 441-449.
D/96




HECKMAN LJ
BINDERY INC. |§|
JUN95
B„u.,„,U^Nn= HESTER.
>

